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Abstract
In this paper we show that long run market informational ineﬃ-
ciency is perfectly compatible with standard rational sequential trade
models. Our ineﬃciency result is obtained taking into account two
features of actual ﬁnancial markets: tradable quantities belong to a
quantity grid and traders and market makers do not have the same de-
gree of risk aversion. The implementation of our model for reasonable
values of the parameters suggests that the long term deviations be-
tween asset prices and fundamental value are important. We explain
the ambiguous role of the quantity grid in exacerbating or mitigat-
ing market ineﬃciency. We show that stock splits can improve the
information content of the order ﬂow and consequently increase price
volatility. (JEL G1, G14, D82, D83)
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11 Introduction
One of the central roles of ﬁnancial markets is to provide information about
asset’s fundamentals through the price system. After the recent collapse of
companies that were commonly considered, and priced, as worthy and safe,
investors questioned the capacity of the market to perform this crucial task.
For example, it is now clear that Enron’s fall was long time coming and
that pieces of information about the company’s problems were spread among
agents. Then, why have the price of Enron’s shares remained for so long far
above the company’s fundamental value?
In ﬁnancial economics, it is generally accepted that when it is possible
to observe the actions of a suﬃciently large number of rational investors,
deviations between transaction prices and long-term market fundamental
eventually vanish.1 This happens because each investor’s action discloses,
at least partially, the investor’s private information on fundamental. This
information is incorporated into the trading prices. Thus, by observing these
prices, it is ultimately possible to infer all the relevant private information
that is dispersed among market participants. In other words, in the long run,
the market is informational eﬃcient. For this reason, some practitioners and
ﬁnancial economists attributed mispricing episodes to market exuberance or
investors irrationality.
In this paper we show that long term mispricing is perfectly compatible
with agent’s rationality. To this purpose, in a standard microstructure model,
we jointly consider two features of ﬁnancial markets: tradable quantities
belong to a quantity grid (in particular it is impossible to trade fractions
of a share); traders and market makers do not have the same degree of
risk aversion. We show that when these two factors are taken into account,
then market is not informational eﬃcient in the long run. In other words,
surprisingly, in the long term the private information regarding the asset
fundamental value cannot be completely incorporated into trading prices.
As in the model we consider, trading prices are equal to the expected value
of the risky asset given the history of trades, we can measure the long-term-
mispricing with the distance between the trading prices in the long run and
the expected value of the asset for someone who has the combined knowledge
of all traders in the economy. We show that in general this distance cannot
1This is a textbook result in ﬁnancial economics. See for example O’Hara (1995)
or Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2001) for a recent review of the ﬁnancial microstructure
literature.
2vanishes, and that the resulting “long term pricing error" can be large. This
could provide a partial explanation to the episodes mentioned above.
More precisely, the model we consider is a sequential trade model similar
to Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Glosten (1989): in each period risk
neutral market makers quote a price schedule for a risky asset. Given the
price schedule, informed risk averse traders choose the size of their trade.
The diﬀerence with the existing literature is that we bring together on the
one hand the existence of a grid for tradable quantities, on the other hand,
discrepancy in risk aversion between dealers and traders.
In order to have an intuition of our result, notice that a risk averse pri-
vately informed trader’s order includes two components: an informational
component and an inventory component. The ﬁr s tc o m p o n e n tc o m e sf r o m
the trader’s informational advantage given by his private information on the
asset’s fundamental. The latter component follows from the trader’s risk
aversion and is not related to the asset’s fundamental. Note that when the
past history of trades provides a suﬃciently precise information about the as-
set’s fundamental, then an additional partially informative private signal will
aﬀect slightly a trader’s belief. Thus, as a trader can demand only discrete
quantities of the asset, a small change in his belief will in general not be suf-
ﬁcient to aﬀect his demand and so, eventually all traders’ demands will only
reﬂect their inventory components. From this point on, the ﬂow of trades
will no longer be informative, the social learning process stops and trading
prices will be bounded away from market fundamental. Long-run-mispricing
will increase with traders’ risk aversion and with the fundamental’s volatility
that cannot be explained through private information. It will decrease with
the precision of traders’ private signals.
In short, when the market is quite sure about the asset fundamental, the
equilibrium is unique and such that the ﬂow of trade does not provide infor-
mation because orders only reﬂects traders’ inventory concerns. Moreover,
if the learning process stops when the market is quite sure about the asset’s
fundamental but in a completely wrong direction, then prices will be trapped
far away from the asset fundamental value, and consequently the long term
pricing error will be large.
Other papers in the ﬁnancial microstructure literature have considered
separately the discrepancy in risk aversion and discrete trading without ob-
taining informational ineﬃciency. For example, in Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) or Easley and O’Hara (1992) traders can only trade discrete quan-
tities (buy 1 asset, sell 1 asset, no trade) but in these models both market
3makers and informed traders are risk neutral, so trades are always informa-
tive because of the absence of the inventory component. In Glosten (1989)
and Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000) risk neutral market makers face
risk averse informed traders, but these models assume that it is possible to
trade a continuum of quantities of the asset so that even a tiny information
component can aﬀect the trader’s order, and for this reason the order ﬂow is
always informative. Thus, our contribution is to show that the combination
of risk aversion and discrete trading generates informational ineﬃciency as
learning process stops at wrong price. Moreover, we show that mispricing
can be large even for realistic calibrations of the model.
Our main result is in line with the theoretical literature on “herd behav-
ior” that proves that sequential interaction of rational investors can generate
rational imitative behavior and this prevents agents from learning the mar-
ket fundamental.2 However, most of the results in this literature are based
on the assumption that transaction prices are exogenously ﬁxed and are not
aﬀected by the information provided by past trades. Therefore, the herd-
ing literature cannot be directly applied to stock markets, and it is clearly
unﬁt to study the issue of the informational content of prices. An informa-
tional ineﬃciency result in presence of endogenous price is obtained by Lee
(1998). He shows that information aggregation failure is due to the existence
of exogenous transaction costs. When the proﬁt from trade is smaller than
the transaction cost, investors stop trading and this prevents the complete
learning of market fundamental. Décamps and Lovo (2002) and Cipriani and
Guarino (2002) show that in a model where traders strategies are restricted
(buy one lot, sell one lot, no trade) herd behavior and long run ineﬃciency
can occur because of diﬀerences in agents’ valuation for the asset.
In this paper we show that informational ineﬃciency is not necessarily
linked to the presence of exogenous frictions in transaction prices due to
inelastic prices (as in the rational herding literature), transaction cost (as
in Lee (1998)) or exogenous diﬀerence in agents valuation for the object (as
Cipriani and Guarino (2002)).
One might wonder whether our theoretical result can account for relevant
long run mispricing even when the lot size is one share. Indeed, with the
advent of on-line trading, traders can trade any integer size without much of
a problem. Can a one-share-discreteness actually induce signiﬁcant long run
mispricing? In order to answer this question, we implement our model for
2See Chamley (2001) for an extensive study on the causes of rational herding.
4reasonable values of parameters. We measure the market ineﬃciency of an
odd lots trading mechanism for a share with expected value 35$ and standard
deviation 7$. We ﬁnd that, for reasonable level of traders’ risk aversion and
private information, the minimum long-run pricing error is about 1.16 $ (i.e.
3.31% of the expected value of the asset), the maximum pricing error can be
about 5,84 $ (i.e. 16.93% of the expected value of the asset) and the expected
pricing error is about 1.93$. (i.e. 5.52% of the expected value of the asset).
We also prove that a change in the minimum trading unit (or lot size)3
has an ambiguous eﬀect on informational ineﬃciency. On the one hand, an
appropriate increase in the minimum trading unit can eliminate the long run
mispricing. However, the choice of such an “informational-eﬃcient lot size"
is not robust to perturbations of the fundamentals of the economy. This sug-
gests that it can be actually diﬃcult to restore eﬃciency through the choice
of an appropriate grid of tradable quantities. On the other hand, decreasing
the lot size reduces, but does not eliminate, the long term ineﬃciency. The
latter observation allows to relate our analysis to the literature on stock splits.
Indeed, a stock split corresponds to a reduction of the minimum trading unit
and therefore stock splits reduce market ineﬃciency. More precisely, a stock
split can temporarily restore the informativeness of trades and consequently
increase price volatility. This could give reasons for the empirical ﬁndings
that a stock split generates higher volatility in the stock’s return (Ohlson
and Penman’s (1985), Koski (1998)). Moreover, the same mechanism could
motivate manager with favorable information about their company to split
their share in order to allow market prices to further incorporate this posi-
tive information. This could be an explanation of the empirical observation
that stock splits are associated with signiﬁcant increases in the stock prices
(Lamoureux and Poon (1987), Amihud et al. (1999)).
In Section 2 the notations, the assumptions and the basic structure of
the model are presented. Section 3 shows the main result. In Section 4 we
implement the model and we discuss stock splits. In Section 5 we generalize
the ineﬃciency result to a broader class of economies. Section 4 concludes.
T h ep r o o f sa r ei nt h eA p p e n d i x .
3The minimum trading unit corresponds to the tick of the quantity grid.
52T h e m o d e l
We consider a sequential trade model in the style of Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) and Glosten (1989): a risky asset is exchanged for money among mar-
ket makers and traders. We denote with v = V + ε the fundamental value
of one share of the asset. v is the sum of two components: a realized shock
V on which agents are asymmetrically informed, and a noise ε that repre-
sents the shocks on fundamental whose realization is unknown to everybody
such as for example future shocks4. For expositional clarity we introduce
some simplifying assumptions on the distribution of V and ε.T h e g e n e r a l
case is discussed in Section 5. We assume that V and ε are independently
distributed and that V is equal to V with probability π0 and to V < V with
probability 1 − π0,m o r e o v e rε has zero mean and strictly positive standard
deviation σε.R e m a r k t h a t V is an unbiased estimator of v,b u tk n o w -
ing V is not suﬃcient to know the exact value of v. Each trader receives
a private partially informative signal s ∈ {l,h}. Signals are conditionally
i.i.d. across traders and independent from ε and from the compositions of
traders’ portfolios. We assume Pr(s =l|V = V )=P r ( s =h|V =V )=p with
1/2 <p<1. The parameter p represents the precision of the signal. Signal
l is more likely when V = V and it can be interpreted as a “Bearish” signal.
Similarly, s = h can be interpreted as a “Bullish” signal. In other words,
E[v|s = l] <E [v] <E [v|s = h]5.
Trading mechanism. Trading occurs sequentially and time is discrete.
Each time interval is long enough to accommodate the trade of at most one
trader. At the beginning of each trading period a trader receives a private
signal s a n dc o m e st ot h em a r k e tw i t ha ne n d o w m e n to fs h a r e sk n o w no n l y
to him. The trader submits a market order and market makers compete
to ﬁll the trader’s order without knowing the trader’s signal and portfolio
composition. We assume that traders leave the market after they have had
the opportunity to trade. We restrict the tradable quantities to belong to a
quantity grid. We denote by δ the minimum trading unit. In other words, a
4This way of modelling the information structure is borrowed from Biais, Martimort
and Rochet (2000). The noise ε takes into account that, as in reality, uncertainty is never
completely resolved.
5The results of the paper do not rely on the independence between V and ε,t h e i r
binomial distribution nor on the fact that the precision of the signal is the same for all
the agents. See Section 5 for the treatment of the general case.
6trader’s market order can be any integer multiple Q (positive or negative) of
a lot of δ shares of the asset. Note that our restriction to discrete quantities
reﬂects the intrinsic nature of ﬁnancial markets. If the exchange’s rules allow
to trade any integer number of shares, then δ =1 .T h i si st h ec a s ef o ro d d
lots trading mechanisms. By contrast, if only round lots can be traded, then
δ is greater than one and it represents the amount of shares in a round lot.6
Market participants. Market makers are risk neutral and traders are risk
averse.7 A trader’s expected utility obtained from a portfolio that contains
an amount X of the risky assets and M of cash is E[u(M + Xv)],w h e r e
u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. For simplicity, we assume that all traders have the
same utility function8 but they can diﬀer for the initial compositions of their
portfolios that are assumed to be independently and identically distributed.
We denote x and m the initial amounts of risky asset and money respectively
for a given trader. Note that x is an integer number (positive or negative) as
traders cannot hold fractions of shares of the asset, hence x ∈ Z and m ∈ R.9
We will refer to x as the trader’s inventory. For a set Θ ⊂ Z × R,w eu s e
F(Θ)=P r ( ( x,m) ∈ Θ) to denote the probability that in a generic period t,
the portfolio composition of a trader is in Θ. We assume that there exist a





Public and private belief. We denote Ht the history of trades up to time
t − 1. All the agents observe Ht b u tt h e yd on o tk n o wt h ei d e n t i t yo fp a s t
traders. As private signals provide information on the realization of V but
n o to nt h er e a l i z a t i o no fε, the learning process on the asset’s fundamental
only regards V. The presence of ε guarantees that the uncertainty on v





the public belief at time t.I fi np e r i o dt a trader submits an





.W e d e n o t e v(πt)=E[v|Ht]=E[V|Ht] the expectation
of v when the belief is πt.At r a d e rr e ﬁnes public information with the one





, s ∈ {h,l},
6Usually, a round lot consists of a lot of 100 shares or a multiple thereof.
7Though the crucial assumption is that market makers and traders have diﬀerent de-
grees of risk aversion, the assumption that market makers are risk neutral simpliﬁes the
analysis.
8See Section 5 for the case of heterogenous traders.
9Z denotes the set of integer numbers, positive and negative.
7an informed traders’ belief at time t.
Agents’ behavior and equilibrium concept. When a trader comes to the
market, he expects a pricing schedule Pδ(.):Z → R , with the interpretation
that if he submits a market order Q ∈ Z positive (negative), then he will buy
δQ shares (resp. sell δQ shares) and pay (resp. receive) Pδ(Q) per share.
Thus, if at the time t trader has portfolio (x,m), received the signal s and
expects a price schedule Pδ(Q), then he will demand the quantity
Q
∗(x,m,Pδ,π t,s)=a r gm a x
Q∈Z
E [u(m +( x + δQ)v − Pδ(Q)δQ)|Ht,s].
Apart from the discreteness in the tradable quantities, competition among
market makers is modeled as in Glosten (1989) or in Kyle (1985). Following
these papers, as market makers are risk neutral and competitive, any trade of
δQ shares must lead to a zero conditional expected proﬁt. Considering that
market makers are ignorant of the portfolio composition and information of
the trader who is trading, a price schedule must satisfy
Pδ(Q)=E[v|Ht,Q
∗ = Q]. (1)
That is the market clearing price is equal to the market makers’ expectation
of v conditional on what they learn about v from the past and current trades.
3 Informational ineﬃciency
This section contains our main result showing that if: (i) traders are risk
averse and market makers are risk neutral, (ii) agents can trade only discrete
quantities; (iii) all the private information is not suﬃcient to completely
resolve uncertainty, i.e. σε > 0;10 then in general the market is not informa-
tional eﬃcient.
In the long run, the market is strong-form informational eﬃcient if all the
information dispersed among the traders in the economy is eventually incor-
porated into market prices. Considering that in our model, traders’ private
information only regards V, E[ε]=0and market makers are risk neutral,
10Consequently, uncertainty cannot be completely resolved even in the long term. We
show however in Section 4 that this assumption is not necessary to generate ineﬃciency.
8we have informational eﬃciency if the trading prices eventually converge to
the realization of V.
Deﬁnition 1: The market is strong-form informational eﬃcient in the
long run, if
lim
t→∞E[|Pδ(Q) − V|]=0 .
Note that trading prices reﬂect the information content of past and cur-
rent trades, and that the information content of a trader’s order is bounded
by the information content of the trader’s private signal. As signals are not
perfectly correlated with V, in order to achieve full eﬃciency, trades must
never cease to be informative. We provide a formal deﬁnition of not infor-
mative trade:
Deﬁnition 2: A trader with portfolio (x,m) who expects a price schedule
Pδ is said to place a not informative order if the order is not aﬀected by the




A c c o r d i n gt ot h i sd e ﬁnition, a trader’s order is not informative when
even knowing the trader’s portfolio composition (x,m),t h eo b s e r v a t i o no f
his order does not allow to infer whether he received a bullish or a bearish
signal. In other words, if a trade of size Q is not informative, then Pr(Q∗ =
Q|V = V )=P r ( Q∗ = Q|V = V ).
We will show that under some conditions on the distribution F,i fi n
period t the public belief πt is suﬃciently close to 1 or to 0, the orders
of all traders in the economy are not informative. In this instance, the
learning process stops and public belief and prices will not change anymore.
Namely, trading prices will remain at level Pδ(Q)=E[V|Ht] for all Q and
all following periods. This is usually referred as an informational cascade in
the herding literature (see for instance Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch
(1992)). Considering that no single order can fully reveal V, eventually
belief πt will be close either to 1 or to 0, and so an informational cascade will
occur before market makers have completely learned V. Thus, contrary to
the common wisdom, the trading prices cannot aggregate completely private
information and the market is not informational eﬃcient in the sense of
9Deﬁnition 1. This phenomenon can led to important long-run mispricing
episodes. When, for instance, πt is suﬃciently close to 1 but the actual
fundamental V is equal to V , the long term pricing error will be close to
v(π) − V ' V − V .
In order to understand why traders’ orders eventually cease to be infor-
mative, it is useful to distinguish two components in the trading motiva-
tions of a risk averse agent: the inventory component and the information
component. The inventory component reﬂects the agent’s preference for low-
risk-portfolios. It increases with the agent’s degree of risk aversion, and
the unresolved uncertainty about the asset’s fundamental. The information
component reﬂects the changes in traders’ belief that follows a bearish or a
bullish signal and can be measured by πh
t −πl
t.11 As signals are not perfectly
informative about V, the information component will decrease as the public
belief πt approaches 0 or 1.12 In other words, if the trader is quite sure about
the realization of V, a partially informative private signal will aﬀect his belief
just slightly. Now, as a trader can demand only discrete quantities of the
asset, a small change in his belief will in general not be suﬃcient to aﬀect his
demand13 and so we will have Q∗(x,m,Pδ,π t,h)=Q∗(x,m,Pδ,π t,l).T h a t
means that, when the public belief is suﬃciently close to 0 or to 1, in general
a trader’s demand only reﬂects his inventory component.
The formal proof is slightly more complex. Indeed, it is always possible to
imagine risk averse traders whose demand is informative no matter how close
to 1, or to 0, is the public belief πt. Thus, in order to characterize ineﬃcient
markets, we precede as follows: ﬁrstly we identify the traders that submit
informative orders even when πt is arbitrarily close to 1 or to 0. Secondly,
we show that the market is informational ineﬃcient if the probability of
observing such “informative traders" is zero.
Suppose that the belief πt i sa l m o s te q u a lt o1 ,o rt o0 ,a n dt a k eat r a d e r
that before receiving the private signal, was indiﬀerent between demanding
an amount of Q∗ lots or Q∗+1. The demand of this trader will be informative.
Indeed, after receiving a tiny informative signal this trader will demand Q∗
if the signal is bearish, whereas he will demand Q∗+1if the signal is bullish.
The following lemma characterizes the set of such traders:
11Indeed, if signals are informative we have πl
t <π t <π h
t .





13Note that this would not be that case if traders could demand a continuum of the
asset.
10Lemma 1 Take πt =1or πt =0 . For any n ∈ Z,t h e r ee x i s tx∗(n), with
δn < x∗(n) <δ (n +1 ) , such that if a trader’s inventory is x∗(n),t h e n
trading −n lots or −n − 1 lots is optimal. If ε is symmetrically distributed
then x∗(n)=δ(n +1 /2).
In other words, when πt is almost equal to 0 or to 1, the only traders whose
orders are informative, are those whose inventories are suﬃciently close to
x∗(n) for some n ∈ Z.14
Consequently, if the quantity grid δ and -or- the traders’ portfolio distrib-
ution F are such that inventories of all traders are bounded away from x∗(n)
for all n ∈ Z, then, by a continuity argument, when the public belief will
be close enough to 0 or to 1, the demand of all traders in the economy will
reﬂect only the inventory component and will provide no information on V.
In this instance the ﬂow of trade will be no more informative and long run
ineﬃciency will occur. Now we turn to the formal statement of our result.
Proposition 1 If for all n ∈ Z the distribution of traders’ portfolio compo-
sition F is such that there is a zero probability that a trader’s inventory is
close to x∗(n),t h e nt h e r ee x i s t sπ > 0 and π<1 such that for πt <πor
πt > π,
(i) all traders’s orders at date t are not informative about V.A sac o n -
sequence πτ = πt for all τ>t .
(ii) the equilibrium is unique and the price schedule satisﬁes Pδ(Q)=
v(πt) for all Q ∈ Z.
Proposition 1 shows that, when the public belief πt is suﬃciently large (or
s m a l l )t h e nt h ee q u i l i b r i u me x i s t s ,i ti su n i q u ea n dn o ti n f o r m a t i v e .P r e c i s e l y
the equilibrium price schedule must be Pδ(Q)=v(πt) for all tradable quan-
tities Q ∈ Z. The result is fairly robust as it is obtained without specifying
the traders’ utility function nor the precise distributions of ε.15
When the hypothesis of Proposition 1 are satisﬁed, the ﬁnancial market
cannot be informational eﬃcient as the learning process stops as soon as the
public belief πt crosses one of the threshold π or π. We call the regions (0,π)
14Note that even when πt =1or πt =0the asset is still risky because of the ε component.
Thus traders trade in order to hedge the risk of their portfolio.
15In order to obtain our ineﬃciency result we do not study the equilibrium for all levels
of the public belief π. Therefore we do not need to restrict our analysis to the case of
CARA utility function and normal distribution of ε, that are the usual assumptions in
ﬁnancial microstructure literature.
11and (π,1) information traps. Indeed if after a trading history the public
belief πt belongs to one of these two regions, it will not move anymore. In
this case, all quantities of the asset will be traded at v(πt) per share, and
the trading price will not change for all the subsequent periods τ>t .T h i s
can potentially lead to highly ineﬃcient markets. For example, suppose that
V = V and that πt ∈ (π,1), then no matter the trading history observed
after t, prices will remain at level P(Q)=v(πt) much larger than V .
The following two corollaries enlighten the role of the lot size in exacer-
bating and mitigating informational ineﬃciency. For example it turns out
that it could be optimal to increase quantity grid in order to restore the mar-
ket informational eﬃciency. Precisely, Corollary 1 states that if the quantity
grid is the ﬁnest one, that is δ =1 , then long run informational ineﬃciency
occurs almost surely for all discrete distribution F of the traders’ portfolios.
Corollary 2 shows that when the noise ε is symmetrically distributed it is
possible to ﬁnd a quantity grid δ that guarantees long run market eﬃciency.
Corollary 1 An odd lot trading mechanism is informational ineﬃcient.
Corollary 2 If ε is symmetrically distributed, then in a round-lot mecha-
nism, long run informational eﬃc i e n c yc a nb eo b t a i n e do n l yb yc h o o s i n ga














In order to have informational eﬃciency in a round lot mechanism, the
size of the round lot δ must be chosen so that the probability of observing
informative order is positive also when the public belief πt reaches extreme
levels. Thus, a regulator that is mainly concerned with the problem of infor-
mational eﬃciency could choose the minimum trading unit that maximizes
the probability of observing orders from traders whose inventory is x∗(n).F o r
Lemma 1, when ε is symmetrically distributed, we have x∗(n)=δ(n +1 /2)
that implies that the optimal δ only depends on the distribution function
F and not on traders’ utility functions. However, it is worth stressing that
a mean-preserving asymmetric perturbation of the distribution of ε would
change the value x∗(n) and this would restore informational ineﬃciency in
the economy. Roughly speaking, informational eﬃciency appears to be very
fragile.
124 Implementation
In order to understand whether the ineﬃciency result of the previous section
can actually account for relevant pricing errors, in this section we consider a
speciﬁcation of our model and we measure the predicted long term pricing
error for reasonable value of the parameters.
Deﬁnition 1 and equation (1) suggest that informational eﬃciency prop-
erties of the market can be measured by the distance between the realization
of V and the trading price in the long run. Hence, the long-term pricing
error (LTPE thereafter) can be deﬁned as the random variable LTPE =
lim
t→∞|V−v(πt)|. For Proposition 1, as soon as the public belief π reaches one
of the two information traps, we have Pδ(Q)=v(π) for all Q. Therefore, in
the long run trading price will be either close to v(π) or to v(π).T h u s , a
threshold π close to 0 and a threshold π close to 1 correspond to a relatively
eﬃcient market. Indeed, on the one hand the prices can reach a region that is
relatively close to the true value of V and, on the other hand, the probability
of observing a trading history that lead the public belief into the “wrong"
information trap is low.
In this section we study how π, π and LTPE are aﬀected by traders’
degree of risk aversion, the volatility of the fundamental and stock splits. To
this purpose, we consider an odd lot trading mechanism (δ =1 ), and we adopt
the standard assumptions of the microstructure literature for what regards
traders utility function and the distribution of ε. That is to say that traders
have negative exponential utility function (with risk aversion coeﬃcient γ)
and that ε is normally distributed. From Corollary 1, we already know that
such a market cannot be informational eﬃcient. The following lemma allows
us to characterize the belief thresholds π and π and to measure the degree
of ineﬃciency for reasonable parameters value.
Lemma 2 Let u(W)=−e−γW ,l e tε  → N(0,σ ε) and let δ =1 ,t h e nπ
(resp. π)i st h em i n i m u mπ>1/2 (resp. maximum π<1/2)s u c ht h a tt h e












γV +( 1− π
l)e
γV. (4)
If for a given level π, the inequalities (3) and (4) are satisﬁed, then an
informed traders chooses to trade exactly his inventory (Q∗ = −x) no matter
13t h es i g n a lh er e c e i v e d , 16 and so his order will only reﬂects his inventory
concerns.
Note ﬁr s tt h a ti fγ is suﬃciently large, then inequalities (3) and (4) will
be met17. This happens because when traders are suﬃciently risk averse the
informational content of their order vanishes as they only trade to reduce the
risk of their portfolio.
Similarly, when the information content of signals is low, i.e. πh is close
to πl, inequalities (3) and (4) will be satisﬁed even if σε is arbitrarily small.18
This implies that the presence of the additional noise ε is not a necessary
condition to obtain informational ineﬃciency. Thus, even if the aggregation
of all private information could resolve uncertainty almost completely, when
traders’ information is not precise19, the existence of a minimum trading
size will induce traders to neglect their information and this will impede the
convergence of prices to fundamental.
Finally, remark that there exists σε suﬃciently large such that no matter
the level of public belief or the information content of the private signal, the
two inequalities are satisﬁed. This means that if the uncertainty coming from
the noise ε is suﬃciently large with respect to the information provided by
the component V, then even signals that are perfectly informative about V
w i l ln o tb er e ﬂected in traders’ orders. Indeed, the asset will be too risky to
be hold even by traders that are perfectly informed about one component of
the asset fundamental value.
To sum up, when i) the traders’ risk aversion is high; or ii) the precision of
private signals is low; or iii) the volatility in market fundamental is mostly due
to shocks on which there is no information, then even an inﬁnite sequence of
t r a d e sw i l ln o ta l l o wt h em a r k e tt oa g g r e g a t et h er e l e v a n tp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o n
dispersed among traders.
Starting from Lemma 2, it is possible to compute numerically π and π for
diﬀerent levels of the contribution of the private information component to
the fundamental’s volatility, and for diﬀerent levels of traders’ risk aversion.
For Proposition 1 in the long run trading price will be either close to v(π)
or to v(π), furthermore, given the symmetry of the parameters, we have
16Remark that as x ∈ Z and δ =1 , it is possible to trade δQ = x.
17Indeed, an increase in γ increases the convexity of the exponential. Moreover, a
suﬃciently large increase in γ reduces the left hand sides of expressions (3) and (4).
18This follows from the convexity of the exponential.
19From Bayes rule, the diﬀerence between πh and πl increases with the precision of the
signal p.
14π =1− π. Consequently, the minimum LTPE is close to |V − v(π)| =
|V −v(π)| =( 1 −π)(V −V ) while the maximum LTPE is close to |V −v(π)| =
|V − v(π)| = π(V − V ).F i n a l l y ,i ti sp o s s i b l et oa p p r o x i m a t et h ee x p e c t e d
long term pricing error20 with E[LTPE] ' 2π(1 − π)(V − V ).
We consider thereafter an asset whose ex-ante expected fundamental value





that is 20% of its ex-ante value, where σ2
V = 1
4(V − V )2. This corresponds
to the magnitude of the average share price and annual volatility in the New
York Stock Exchange.
Figure 1 depicts π and π when keeping constant E[v] = 35$ and σ =7 $
and varying σV/σ.21 The ratio σV/σ represents the proportion of the total
volatility of asset’s fundamental that could be explained by aggregating all
t h ep r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o n .T h ep a r a m e t e r ss e ti s(γ =0 .08,p=0 .8).W h e n
σV/σ increases, the information traps shrink and the market improves its
informational eﬃciency. For example when σV/σ =0 .5,t h e nπ ' 0,165 and
π ' 0,835,w h e r e a sf o rσV/σ =0 .9 we have π ' 0,021 and π ' 0,979.
Interestingly we also deduce from Figure 1 that, when the information in
the economy can explain less than 42% of the fundamental’s volatility, the
market mechanism fails completely to aggregate any private information.22
Table 1 reports approximations of the minimum LTPE ,o ft h em a x i m u m
LTPE and of the expected long run pricing error when varying σV/σ.W h e n
for example 50% of the standard deviation of v could be explained with the
private information, then the minimum LTPE is 1.16 $ and the maximum
LTPE is 5.84 $. Saying it diﬀerently, in the long term the trading price is
either “wrong" by 1.16$ in one direction or by 5.84$ in the opposite direction,
and the expected pricing error is about 2.25$. These pricing errors correspond
to 3.31%, 16.93% and 5.52% of the expected fundamental value of the asset
respectively. The larger the ratio σV/σ, the smaller the expected long term
error.
Figure 2 depicts π and π when changing the traders’ degree of risk aver-
sion γ. The parameters set is (σV/σ =0 .6,p=0 .8). As the traders’ risk
aversion increases, traders will exchange the asset mainly for inventory rea-
son, the inventory component overwhelms the information component, and
the market informational ineﬃciency increases. For example when γ moves
20See the Appendix.
21Note that in order to vary σV /σ keeping constant σ =7 $and E[v] = 35$ it is necessary
to vary σε, V and V .
22That is for all π ∈ (0,1) the inequalities of Lemma 2 is satisﬁed.
15from 0.02,t o0.08, π and π move from 0.015 and 0.985 respectively to 0,106
and 0.894.
Table 2 reports the approximations for the minimum, maximum LTPE
and the expected long run pricing error for diﬀerent levels of traders’ risk
aversion. For γ =0 ,06 the minimum and maximum LTPE are of 1.53% and
22.45% of the ex-ante value of the asset respectively. The expected long run
error is about 1 $ that represents 2.87% of E[v]. An increase in traders risk
aversion reduces the informational eﬃciency of the market.
4.1 Stock Splits
The market value of a ﬁrm’s equity is independent from the number of shares
outstanding. Thus, a stock splits should not aﬀect the distribution of stocks
returns. Nevertheless, Ohlson and Penman (1985) and Koski (1998) ﬁnd
that stock return volatility increases after stock splits. Ohlson and Penman
interpret this phenomenon as an increase in the presence of noise traders.
Gottlieb and Kalay (1985) attributed this increase in volatility to the presence
of a price grid.23 However, in Koski (1998) the volatility increase does not
appear to be due to rounding to discrete price level as suggested by Gottlieb
and Kalay. Our model provides an alternative explanation of the eﬀects of a
stock split on price volatility and consequently return volatility.
In order to see how a stock split increases price volatility, note ﬁrst that a
stock split corresponds to a reduction of the minimum unit of trade. Indeed,
before the stock split the fundamental value of one unit of trade is δv.A f t e r
splitting each share into n new shares, the fundamental value of each new
share will be v0 = v/n, and so the value of one lot of δ new shares is δv0 = δ
nv.
But this is perfectly equivalent to reducing the minimum unit of trade from
δ shares to δ/n shares without splitting the stock , in this case, the value of
the new unit of trade would be δ
nv.
Second observe that a reduction of the unit of trade decreases π and
increases π. Figure 3 depicts π and π following a split of the stock. On the
horizontal axis there is the number of new share obtained from one old share
after the stock split. The parameters set is (σV/σ =0 .6,p=0 .8,γ =0 .1).
For the given levels of parameters, in the absence of a stock split we have
π ' 0,178 and π ' 0,822 that correspond to an expected LTPE of 2.46$
23Gottlieb and Kalay (1985) show that when continuous prices are rounded to discrete
p r i c el e v e l s ,t h ev a r i a n c eo fr e t u r nc o m p u t e d using the round prices exceeds the variance
of unrounded returns.
16(see also Table 3). However, it is suﬃcient to split each share into two
new shares in order to obtain a dramatic reduction of the ineﬃciency as the
expected LTPE drops to 0.77$. Splitting each share into 10 new shares,
we have π ' 0,005 and π ' 0,995 that is a huge informational eﬃciency
improvement.
How is this result related to price volatility? Note that as long as πt does
not lie into an information trap, trading prices can vary within a range of
about v(π) − v(π). Thus, after a stock split this range increases allowing a
higher volatility for prices. Note also that a stock split can increase the price
volatility by restoring the informativeness of trade in case of informational
cascade. For example, suppose that before the split, the public belief πt was
in an information trap. Then the asset is traded only for inventory reasons,
trades do not transmit information on the asset fundamental, and trading
prices will be steady. In case of stock split, the information traps shrink,
and for the same level of public belief πt, informativeness of trade can be
temporarily restored. Thus the volatility of trading prices increases.24
5 Extensions
In order to simplify the analysis, in the previous sections we introduced some
strong assumptions on agent characteristics and on the distribution of the
risky asset’s fundamentals. Namely we assumed homogeneity of traders’ util-
ity functions, binomial distribution for V and s, and independence between
V and ε. In this section we discuss the robustness of our result when these
three assumptions are relaxed. We denote by v(Z,N) the fundamental value
of the asset that depends on two components: a realized shock Z on which
agents are asymmetrically informed, and a noise N that represents the shocks
on fundamentals whose realization is unknown to everybody. Random vari-
ables Z and N may lay in any measurable space, whereas v takes value in
R+. We assume that the aggregation of all the private information that is
dispersed among investors allows to know the realization of Z. Still, knowing
Z w i l ln o tb es u ﬃcient to completely resolve the uncertainty on the funda-
24Besides, the same mechanism can induce managers with favorable information about
their companies to split their share in order to allow a positive reaction of prices to the
order ﬂow. This would provide a further explanation to the empirical observation that
stock splits lead to higher stock prices as shown by Lamoureux and Poon (1987) and
Amihud et al. (1999).
17mental value of the asset because of N.W ed e n o t eV =E[v|Z] the expected
fundamental value of the asset after aggregating all the private information.
And we denote ε = v − V the remaining error, where ε has zero mean and
positive standard deviation σε > 0. Thus, we can assume without loss of
generality that v = V + ε and that agents private information regards V
but not ε.
We assume that the random variable V takes value in a bounded set
Ω ∈ I R+. The random variables V and ε are not independently distributed.
Still E[V] is an unbiased estimator of v: E[ε]=0and σε > 0.E a c h
trader receives a partially informative private signal s that takes value in a
bounded set Σ. Without loss of generality, we assume that conditional on
the realization of V, private signals are independent. We assume that for
all V ∈ Ω and s ∈ Σ,w eh a v eg(s|V )=P r ( s = s|V = V ) > 0.25 That
means that private signals are not perfectly informative as each realization of
the signal is compatible with all realizations of V.26 Finally, we assume that
knowing a trader’s inventory does not change the expectation of V,t h a ti s
to say that for all levels of inventory x and x0 we have
E[V|a trader’s inventory is x]=E[V|a trader’s inventory is x
0].
This last assumption guarantees that whenever a trader exchanges only for
inventory reason his order will provide no additional information about V.27
Finally we assume that traders are risk averse but they can diﬀer in their
utility functions and not only in the composition of their portfolio. The
following proposition extends Corollary 1 to the general set up considered in
this section.
Proposition 2 An odd lot trading mechanism is informational ineﬃcient.
Proposition 2 shows that market ineﬃciency does not rely on the simpli-
fying assumptions we have introduced in the previous sections. Indeed, even
the less risk averse trader who received the most precise signal, will even-
tually trade only for inventory reason once the public beliefs are suﬃciently
25If s is continuously distributed g(.) shall be interpreted as the conditional density of
s.
26This condition is equivalent the condition pql > 0 at page 1000 in Bikhchandani et al.
(1992).
27Note that this is weaker than assuming independence between the distribution of a
trader’s private signal and his inventory. For instance, it is possible that traders with large
inventory in absolute value have more precise signals.
18precise about market fundamentals. Thus, we can say that the informational
ineﬃciency arises when there is a general agreement on the asset’s funda-
mental. In these cases, informed traders are prone to ignore their signals
and trade only for inventory reasons. Note also that our result is obtained
assuming that there is a zero measure of risk neutral traders. Décamps and
Lovo (2002) in a simpliﬁed model show that ineﬃciency can also occur when
traders are risk neutral provided that dealers are risk averse. This suggest
that what lead to ineﬃciency is not the absence of risk neutral traders but
the absence of traders whose utility functions are identical to those of market
makers.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We studied the informational eﬃciency properties of a ﬁnancial market when
one takes into account two factors: ﬁrst, agents can trade only integer quan-
tities of assets; second, traders and market makers do not have the same
degree of risk aversion. We show that an odd lot trading mechanism leads
to market ineﬃciency in the sense that in the long run, prices are bounded
away from the value of the asset given all the information dispersed in the
market. Indeed, when public belief are suﬃciently precise, traders’ order
only reﬂect their inventory concerns and thus provide no information about
the asset fundamental value. Implementing our model for reasonable values
of the parameters leads to large long run pricing errors. Long run market
ineﬃciency increases with traders’ risk aversion, with the proportion of fun-
damental’s volatility that cannot be explained with private information and
it decreases with the precision of informed traders’ signals.
We show that decreasing the unit of trade can reduce but does not elim-
i n a t em a r k e ti n e ﬃciency. This provides an alternative explanation of the
empirical observation that stock splits increase stock return volatility. We
show that an appropriate increase of the minimum trading unit can restore
completely long run informational eﬃciency. Still, the choice of an “eﬃ-
cient quantity grid" is not robust to small perturbation of the fundamentals’
distribution.
The fact that our results are obtained within a fairly general framework
and by introducing reasonable assumptions into standard microstructure
models, suggests that the informational eﬃciency hypothesis is not com-
19patible with the way economists are used to model the trading process in
ﬁnancial markets.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:T a k eπt =1 ,i nt h i sc a s ePδ(Q)=V .L e tU(x,Q) be a
traders’ expected utility from trading Q at price V when his initial inventory
is x, i.e. U(x,Q)=E[u(m + xV +( x + δQ)ε]. Then from risk aversion
and from the fact that traders wealth is bounded, we have that U(δn,−n) >
U(δn,−(n+1))and U(δ(n+1),−n) <U(δ(n+1),−(n+1)).T h u s ,f r o mt h e
continuity of U in x there exists x∗(n) ∈ (δn,δ(n+1))such that if x = x∗(n),
then the trader is indiﬀerent between trading −n lots or −(n +1 )lots.
In order to see that when x = x∗(n) both these quantities are opti-
mal, note that if the trader could trade a continuum of quantities, then he
would trade exactly −x
δ. The trader is however constrained to trade integer
multiples of δ. Taking advantage from the concavity in Q of U(x,Q),t h e
constrained optimal tradable quantities are the closest to −x
δ that is −δn
and −δ(n +1 ) . Finally if ε is symmetrically distributed, then ε and −ε are
identically distributed and so U(δ(n +1 /2),−n)=U(δ(n +1 /2),−(n +1 ) )
that means x∗(n)=δ(n+1/2). The proof for the case πt =0is symmetric.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :Note ﬁr s tt h a ta sq u o t e sm u s ts a t i s f ye q u a t i o n
(1) and the informativeness of an order is bounded by the precision of a
traders’ order, we have that in equilibrium, at any date t, v(πl
t) ≤ Pδ(Q) ≤
v(πh
t ) for all Q ∈ Z. Thus, for any price schedule Pδ(Q) satisfying this
















































t is continuous in πt and that u is a continuous function.
Moreover, when πt is close to 1 or to 0, an informative signal aﬀects slightly






































From Lemma 1 we know that if x 6= x∗(n) for all n ∈ Z,t h e nt h e r ee x i s ta











m + xV +( x + δQ)ε
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Thus, from expression (7), it must be that for πt suﬃciently close to 1 and













































Now take an informed trader whose inventory x is bounded away from x∗(n)
for all n ∈ Z, and suppose he expects a price schedule Pδ(Q). His maximiza-
tion problem will be:
argmax
Q∈Z
E [u(m +( x + δQ)v − δQPδ(Q))|s].









>E[u(m +( x + δQ)v − δQPδ(Q))|s]
for all Q 6= b Q.T h a t i s i f πt is suﬃciently close to 1, this trader will trade
aq u a n t i t yb Q no matter he received a bearish or a bullish signal. Therefore
his action will provide no information on V. To conclude the proof it is
21suﬃcient to observe that because of the hypothesis on F, for all n ∈ Z there
is no trader whose inventory is not bounded away from x∗(n). Thus, traders’
demand is not informative, and so, from equation (1), the price schedule must
be Pδ(Q)=E[v|Ht] for all Q ∈ Z. In order words, when πt is suﬃciently
close to 1, there exist no equilibrium where the traders orders are informative.
In order to prove that a not informative equilibrium exist, it is suﬃcient to
observe that for πt close to 1, Q∗(x,m,v(πt),π t,s)=b Q for all s.A ni d e n t i c a l
argument applies for πt suﬃciently close to 0.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 : Simply remark that from Lemma 1, when δ =1
we have x∗(n) ∈ (n,n+1). That means that when πt reaches extreme levels,
the only traders whose orders are informative are traders that hold fractions
of the asset.28 However, all traders in the economy hold only integer amounts
of the asset, x ∈ Z, and thus, from Proposition 1, eventually trade will stop
providing information on V.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y2 : From Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 we know that
the only traders whose orders are informative even when πt is arbitrarily
close to 0 or to 1 are those whose inventory is equal to x∗(n) for some n ∈ Z.






Therefore δ should be chosen such that there exist a positive probability of
observing these traders, thus the inequality (2).
Proof of Lemma 2: From Proposition 1 we know that when all traders’
orders are not informative, in equilibrium P(Q)=v(πt) for all Q.F r o m
Corollary 1 we deduce that when πt is suﬃciently close to 1 or to 0 and
P(Q)=v(πt), then a trader with inventory x ∈ Z will trade exactly −x no
matter he received a bullish or a bearish signal. As the expression E[u(m +
(x + q)v − v(πt)q)|s] is a strictly concave function in the traded quantity
q ∈ R, then it will have a unique maximum. Thus in order to ﬁnd π (resp.
π), it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd the minimum π>1/2 (resp. maximum π<1/2)
such that the trader prefers to trade −x rather than −x − 1 or −x +1for
both s = h and s = l.T h a ti st os a y
u(m+v(π)x) > max{E[u(m + v +( x − 1)v(π))|s],E[u(m − v +( x +1 ) v(π))|s]
(10)
28Moreover, as the traders wealth is bounded, we know that x∗(n) is bounded away
from n or n +1 .
22for s = h and s = l. Considering that u(W)=−e−γw and that ε  → N(0,σ ε),
we have that expression (10) is satisﬁed only if both inequalities in Lemma
2a r em e t .
Approximation of the long term pricing error:P r o p o s i t i o n1s h o w s
that, at the equilibrium, the long term price e P ≡ limt→∞ E[v|Ht] will be
either close to v(π) or to v(π). Assuming the initial public belief is 1
2,t h ee x













(v(π) − V )Pr( ˜ P ≥ v(π)|V = V )+( v(π) − V )Pr( ˜ P ≤ v(π)|V = V )
´
.
Indeed the probability that the long term price being close to v(π) is equal
to the probability of the public belief reaches the level π. Moreover, from
t h es y m m e t r yo ft h em o d e lw ed e d u c et h a tg i v e nt h a t( ˜ P ≥ v(π)|V = V )=
Pr( ˜ P ≤ v(π)|V = V ). Based on the ﬁrst passage time approach developed
in Diamond and Verrechia (1987) we obtain a proxy for the long term pricing
error:
Claim: Assuming the initial public belief is 1
2, a proxy for the expectation
of the long term pricing error is given by
2ππ(V − V ).
We prove this Claim as follows: Let consider the likelihood ratio Lt =
πt
1−πt.W e h a v e Lt = Πi=t
i=1r(Qi,π i) where r(Qi,π i)=
Pr(Qi |V =V, H i)
Pr(Qi |V =V ,Hi).T h e
ratio r(Qi,π i) is interpreted as the informative content of trader i’s order of
size Qi. As we do not know the equilibrium strategies when πt ∈ (π,π),w e
approximate the information content of a trade assuming that as long as πt ∈
(π,π) market makers can perfectly infer the traders’ signals from their orders.
Thus, as long as πt ∈ (π,π),t h er a t i or(Qt,π t) takes the value
p
1−p when the
trader’s order Qt reveals a bullish signal and the value
1−p
p when the order Qt
reveals a bearish signal. Consequently, under this approximation, r(Qt,π t)








1−π is passed. The probability that the public belief πt reaches
the threshold π given that the fundamental value of the asset is V is equal
to Pr(LN ≥ π
1−π | V = V ). Using the same techniques29 than Diamond
and Verrechia (1987), we obtain Pr(LN ≥ π
1−π |V = V )=
(1−2π)(1−π)
π−π ,a n d
Pr(LN ≤
π
1−π |V = V )=
(2π−1)π
π−π f r o mw h i c hw ed e d u c eo u rr e s u l t .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :T h ep r o o fi ss i m i l a rt ot h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n
1. First we show that the price schedule has an upper and a lower bound that
converge to E[V] as public information becomes suﬃciently precise. Then
we show that, whenever trading prices are suﬃciently close to E[V] and
public information is suﬃciently precise, all risk averse traders will optimally
choose to trade Q∗ = −x no matter the signal they received. Thus, the
informational content of the order ﬂow vanishes and prices will not converge
to fundamental.
We say that the public ex-ante belief is suﬃciently precise at time t if
Va r(V|Ht) is positive but suﬃciently close to 0. Remark that preciseness
of ex-ante public belief has nothing to do with the fact that agents’ belief
are actually correct. Indeed, very precise public belief can turn out to be
completely wrong.
Now, for any ﬁnite history Ht it is always possible to ﬁnd two signals in
Σ that ,with an abuse of notation, we will denote l and h, such that
E[V|Ht,s = l] ≤ E[V|Ht,s = s] ≤ E[V|Ht,s = h]
for all s ∈ Σ. Note that, from standard property of the conditional variance
we have Va r(V|Ht)=E [Va r(V|Ht, s)] + Va r(E [V|Ht, s]).T h u s , i f
Va r(V|Ht) lies in a small neighborhood of 0 then it is also the case for
Va r(V|Ht, s).M o r e o v e r , a s g(s|V ) > 0 for all V ∈ Ω and s ∈ Σ,w e
have that E[V|Ht,s = h] − E[V|Ht,s = l] is close to 0 when Va r(V|Ht)
is suﬃciently close to 0. In other words, if the public belief is suﬃciently
precise, then private signals aﬀect private beliefs just slightly.
Now, consider that market makers cannot infer from a trader’s order more
than what the trader know, and that a trader’s inventory does not provide
29Precisely we use theorem 9.34 page 549 of Schervish (1995). In a related vein we can
deduce from the Wald’s lemma page 552 of Schervish (1995) that our proxy underestimates
the average long term pricing error.
24information about the expectation of V. Thus, from equation (1) we have
that at time t the price schedule satisﬁes
E[V|Ht,s = l] ≤ Pδ(Q) ≤ E[V|Ht,s = h], ∀Q ∈ Z.
Let ui be a trader i’s utility function that is continuous strictly increasing and
concave. Let denote vl
t = E[V|Ht,s = l],a n dvh
t = E[V|Ht,s = h].T h e n
equations (5) and (6) still hold after substituting ui, vh
t , vl
t to u, v(πh
t ), v(πl
t)
respectively. Moreover, because of risk aversion E [ui (m + xV +( x + δQ)ε)]
is maximized for Q∗ = −x.I fVa r(V |Ht) is suﬃciently small, then equations
(8) and (9) will still hold after substituting ui, vh
t , vl
t and −x to u, v(πh
t ),
v(πl
t) and b Q respectively. Thus for Va r(V |Ht) suﬃciently close to 0:
argmax
Q∈Z
E [ui (m +( x + δQ)v − δQPδ(Q))|s]=−x ∀s ∈ Σ.
That means that when public belief are suﬃciently precise, traders’ order
only reﬂect their inventory concerns and provides no information about V.
8 References
Amihud Y., H. Mendelson and J. Uno, 1999, “Number of Shareholders and
Stock Prices: Evidence from Japan”, Journal of Finance, 54, pp. 1169-1184.
B i a i s ,B . ,D .M a r t i m o r ta n dJ . C .R o c h e t ,2 0 0 0 ,“ C o m p e t i n gM e c h a n i s m si n
a Common Value Environment”, Econometrica, 68, 4, 799-837.
Biais B., L. Glosten, and C. Spatt, 2002. “The Microstructure of Stock Mar-
kets”. CEPR Discussion Paper no. 3288. London, Centre for Economic
Policy Research. http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP3288.asp.
Bikhchandani S., D. Hirshleifer, I. Welch, 1992, “A Theory of Fads, Fashion,
Custom and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades”, Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 100, pp. 992-1026.
Chamley C., 2001, “Rational Herds”, http://econ.bu.edu/chamley/chamley.html,
University of Boston.
25Cipriani M. , A. Guarino, 2002, “Herd Behavior and Contagion in Financial
Markets”, mimeo, New York University.
Décamps J.P., S. Lovo, 2002, “Risk Aversion and Herd Behavior in Financial
Markets”, HEC CR 758/2002.
Diamond D.W., R.E. Verrechia, 1987, “Constraints on Short-selling and As-
set Price Adjustments to Private Information ”, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 18, pp. 277-311
Easley D., M. O’Hara, 1992, “Time and the Process of Security Price Ad-
justment ”, Journal of Finance, 57, pp. 577-605.
Glosten L., 1989, “Insider Trading, Liquidity and the Role of the Monopolist
Specialist”, Journal of Business, 62, pp. 211-235.
Glosten L., P. Milgrom, 1985, “Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Spe-
cialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders”, Journal of Financial
Economics, 14, pp. 71-100.
Gottlieb G and A. Kalay, 1985, “Implication of the Discreteness of Observed
Stock Prices”, Journal of Finance, 40, pp. 135-153.
Koski J., 1998, “Measurement Eﬀects and the Variance of Returns after Stock
Splits and Stock Dividends", Review of Financial Studies, 11, pp. 143-162.
Lamoureux C.G., P. Poon, 1987, “The Market Reaction to Stock Splits”,
Journal of Finance, 42, pp. 1347-1370.
Lee I. H., 1998, “Market Crashes and Informational Avalanches”, Review of
Economic Studies, 65, 741-759.
O’Hara M. , 1995, Market Microstructure Theory, Blackwell Publishers.
Ohlson J.A., S. Penman, 1985, “Volatility Increases Subsequent to Stock
Splits: An Empirical Aberration”, Journal of Financial Economics,1 4 ,p p .
251-266.
26Schervish M.J, 1995, Theory of Statistics, Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
27Table 1: Long term pricing error for diﬀerent σV/σ
σV/σ minimum LTPE maximum LTPE E[LTPE] V
value in $ %o fE[v] value in $ %o fE[v] value in $ %o fE[v]
0.42 1.75 4.99% 4.13 11.61% 2.45 7.01% 33
0.5 1.16 3.31% 5.84 16.93% 1.93 5.52% 31
0.6 0.89 2.56% 7.51 21.44% 1.60 4.57% 30
0.7 0.69 1.97% 9.11 26.03% 1.28 3.67% 30
0.8 0.47 1.39% 10.71 30.61% 0.93 2.66% 29
0.9 0.26 0.74% 12.34 35.26% 0.51 1.45% 28
0.99 0.01 0.04% 13.85 29.56% 0.03 0.07% 28
Comparison of the long term pricing errors for diﬀerent levels of σV/σ.T h e
parameter set is E[v]=3 5 $ , σ =7 $ , γ =0 .08, p =0 .8. The minimum LTPE
is deﬁned as π(V − V ),t h em a x i m u mLTPE is deﬁned as π(V − V ) and the
expected LTPE is deﬁned as 2ππ(V −V ). All these measures are given both in
absolute value and in percentage of the ex-ante expected value of the asset E[v].
28Table 2: Long term pricing error for diﬀerent γ
γ minimum LTPE maximum LTPE E[LTPE]
value in $ %o fE[v] value in $ %o fE[v] value in $ %o fE[v]
0.01 0.06 0.16% 8.34 23.84% 0.11 0.32%
0.02 0.12 0.35% 8.28 23.65% 0.24 0.69%
0.04 0.29 0.84% 8.11 23.14% 0.57 1.62%
0.06 0.53 1.53% 7.86 22.45% 1.00 2.87%
0.08 0.89 2.56% 7.51 21.44% 1.60 4.57%
0.1 1.50 4.28% 6.90 19.72% 2.46 7.03%
0.11 2.05 5.84% 6.35 18.15% 3.10 8.85%
Comparison of the long term pricing errors for diﬀerent levels of traders’ risk
aversion γ. The parameter set is E[v]=3 5 $ , σ =7 $ , σV/σ =0 .6, p =0 .8,V =
30.8$,V =3 9 .2$. The minimum LTPE is deﬁned as π(V − V ),t h em a x i m u m
LTPE is deﬁned as π(V −V ) and the expected LTPE is deﬁned as 2ππ(V −V ).
All these measures are given both in absolute value and in percentage of the ex-ante
expected value of the asset E[v].
29Table 3: Long term pricing after a stock split
new shares minimum LTPE maximum LTPE E[LTPE]
value in $ %o fE[v] value in $ %o fE[v] value in $ %o fE[v
1 1.50 4.28% 6.90 19.72% 2.46 7.03%
2 0.40 1.15% 8.00 22.85% 0.77 2.20%
4 0.16 0.46% 8.24 23.54% 0.32 0.90%
6 0.10 0.29% 8.30 23.71% 0.20 0.56%
8 0.07 0.20% 8.33 23.79% 0.14 0.41%
10 0.05 0.16% 8.34 23.84% 0.11 0.32%
Comparison of the long term pricing errors after splitting the stock in to 2
to 10 new shares. The parameter set is E[v]=3 5 $ , σ =7 $ , σV/σ =0 .6,
p =0 .8,γ =0 .1, V =3 0 .8$, V =3 9 .2$. The minimum LTPE is deﬁned as
π(V −V ),t h em a x i m u mLTPE is deﬁned as π(V −V ) and the expected LTPE
is deﬁned as 2ππ(V − V ). All these measures are given both in absolute value
and in percentage of the ex-ante expected value of the asset E[v].















Figure 1: This ﬁgure shows π(–) and π(- - -) as function of the proportion
of fundamental volatility that can be explained with the aggregation of private
information. The set of parameters is E[v]=3 5 $ , σ =7 $ , γ =0 .08, p =0 .8.















Figure 2: This ﬁgure shows π(–) and π(- - -) as function of the traders’ risk
aversion coeﬃcient γ. The set of parameters is E[v]=3 5 $ , σ =7 $ , σV/σ =0 .6,
p =0 .8,V =3 0 .8$,V =3 9 .2$.















Figure 3: This ﬁgure shows π(–) and π(- - -) as function of the number of new
share obtained from one old share after the stock split. The set of parameters is
E[v]=3 5 $ , σ =7 $ , σV/σ =0 .6, p =0 .8,γ=0 .1, V =3 0 .8$, V =3 9 .2$.
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